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Abstract: We design an experiment to test whether the behavior of dictators can be 
rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function. By giving the recipients an 
endowment of varying levels, we create an environment that allows for observable 
differences in behavior depending upon whether pure or impure altruism is the primary 
motivation. We find that the behavior of 66 percent of the dictators can be rationalized by 
the impurely altruistic utility function, while only 40 percent of the dictators make 
choices that are consistent with the purely altruistic utility function.  
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Andreoni and Miller (2002) studied the altruistic behavior of individuals and found a 
significant degree of rationality. They studied behavior in the context of the dictator game 
in which a subject – the dictator – has the opportunity to share her endowment with 
another subject – the recipient. They showed that subjects’ choices can be rationalized by 
a well-behaved purely altruistic utility function. That is, the dictator’s problem can be 
modeled as choosing the optimal amount to pass to maximize a utility function in which 
the two final payoffs are the only arguments.
1 To establish this result, Andreoni and 
Miller examined subjects’ choices made on different budget sets and showed that the 
choices satisfied the Generalized Axiom of Reveal Preferences (GARP). This result, by 
Afriat’s theorem (1967), is equivalent to establishing the existence of a well-behaved 
utility function.  
 The pure altruism model predicts that a $1 transfer from the donor to the 
recipient by the experimenter, or by the government in case of a charity, completely 
crowds out the private donation; that is, the private donation decreases by exactly $1. 
Suppose, for example, that equalizing final payoffs is the optimal choice for the dictator 
in a game in which the dictator’s endowment is $10 and the recipient’s endowment is $0. 
That is, passing $5 maximizes the dictator’s utility. Then, a $1 transfer from the dictator’s 
endowment to the recipient’s endowment, which reduces the dictator’s endowment to $9 
and increases the recipient’s endowment to $1, should not alter the dictator’s optimal 
choice of equal payoffs, and the dictator should reduce the optimal amount passed to $4. 
So, a $1 transfer crowds out the dictator’s giving by exactly $1, leading to complete 
crowding-out.  
Contrary to the dollar-for-dollar prediction of the pure altruistic model, evidence 
from empirical studies and experiments demonstrates that crowding out is incomplete. 
Many empirical studies (an incomplete list includes Kingma (1989), Okten and Weisbrod 
(2000), Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995), Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), Manzoor and 
                                                 
1 The final payoffs of the dictator and the recipient are the only arguments in a number of other-
regarding utility models including Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and 
Rabin (2002), and Cox and Sadiraj (2010), among others. 3 
 
Straub (2005), Hungerman (2005), Borgonovi (2006), Gruber and Hungerman (2007), 
and Andreoni and Payne (2009)) show that crowding out is quite small, ranging from 0 
percent to 30 percent.  Payne (1998) reports somewhat larger but still incomplete 
crowding out of about 50 percent after controlling for an endogeneity bias.  In a public 
good game, Andreoni (1993, 1995) reports that, after a $2 transfer, the average 
contribution to a public fund decreased by $1.43, or 71percent of $2, even after 
controlling for possible subjects’ confusion. Andreoni (1993) concludes that “…, the 
behavior in the experiment is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that people get 
pleasure from the act of contributing to the public good” (p. 1325).   In a dictator game, 
Bolton and Katok (1998) report that, after a $3 transfer from the dictator to the recipient, 
the average pass decreased by 86 cents, or 29 percent of $3.  Bolton and Katok conclude 
that incomplete crowding out “is direct evidence that donor preferences are incompletely 
specified by the standard [pure altruistic] model” (p. 315).   
Incomplete crowding out is consistent with the impure altruism model which 
includes a third argument in the utility function, the amount passed by the donor 
(Andreoni 1989, 1990). Over ten years before his 2002 contribution, Andreoni (1990) 
had observed that “…the ‘pure altruism’ model is extremely special, and its predictions 
are not easily generalized. …The impure altruism model is consistent with observed 
pattern of giving” (p. 465). Adding the amount passed as an additional argument into the 
utility function implies that the donor has a taste for giving and derives utility from the 
very act of passing in addition to the final payoffs.
2  Consider again the situation in which 
the dictator’s endowment is $10, the recipient’s endowment is $0 and the dictator chooses 
to pass $5.  After the $1 transfer, a $4 pass would again equalize final payoffs. However, 
the optimal pass now would exceed $4 because the dictator derives utility from passing. 
After a $1 transfer, the dictator decreases her pass by less than $1 because she enjoys 
passing.      
In this paper, we test whether dictators’ choices can be rationalized by the impure 
altruism utility function.  To our knowledge, no existence result has been established for 
                                                 
2 Palfrey and Prisbey (1996, 1997) report evidence of a taste for giving in linear public goods 
games. Also, in the context of the dictator game, Crumpler and Grossman (2008) report that participants 
donate 20 percent of their endowment even if the amount of money that the charity receives is preset and 
any contribution by the participant crowds out dollar-for-dollar the giving by the proctor. 4 
 
the impure altruism model in an equivalent fashion to the Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
result for the pure altruism model.  We fill this gap. We find that the behavior of 66 
percent of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function, 
while only 40 percent of the dictators make choices that are consistent with the pure 
altruistic utility model.  We also estimate the utility function for each individual and use 
the estimates to forecast successfully incomplete crowding-out for Bolton and Kartok’s 
(1998) and List’s (2007) experiments.  Our study extends Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) 
work by showing that altruistic behavior exhibits a significant degree of rationality in a 
more general setting that allows transfers to the recipient and, therefore, the possibility of 
crowding out.   
 
2.  Experimental Design 
 
We modify the Andreoni and Miller experimental design to test whether dictators’ 
choices can be rationalized by a well-behaved impure altruistic utility function, 
(,, ) DR UP π π , when crowding out is possible. As in Andreoni and Miller we vary prices.  
We also vary the endowments given to both the dictator and the recipient, as in Korenok 
et al. (2010).  The result is a dictator game in which the dictator chooses the amount to 













In (1),  D π  is the dictator’s final payoff, ED is the dictator’s endowment,  R π is the 
recipient’s final payoff, ER is the recipient’s endowment, the hold price, ph, multiplies the 
amount that dictator holds for herself and the pass price, pp, multiplies the amount the 
recipient receives from the dictator.
3 Multiplying the amount passed to the recipient by a 
price introduces the possibility to tax ( 1 p p < ) or subsidize ( 1 p p > ) the altruistic 
donation of the dictator. The traditional dictator game occurs when ER =0 and ph = pp =1.   
                                                 
3 We choose not to attach a price to the recipient’s endowment to simplify the dictator’s decision 
with no loss of generality.   5 
 
  In the experiments, the subjects are given a menu of choices characterized by 
different endowments of tokens and different prices, as specified in the first five columns 
of Table 1. Each budget in Table 1 specifies the number of tokens to be divided by the 
dictator, the number of points each token is worth to each subject and the number of 
points already allocated to the recipient.  Consider for example the budget in the second 
row where ED = 17, ER =11, ph =3 and pp =1. In this case, both the dictator and the 
recipient have a positive endowment, 17 tokens for the dictator and 11 points for the 
recipient. Also, given the prices, passing one token reduces by three points the dictator’s 
final payoff and increases by 1 point the recipient’s payoff, so that the relative price of 
giving is 3.  
 
Table 1: Budgets and Average Dictators’ Choices 
















4 Sessions  5-6
1 40  0  1  3  0.33  7.37  11.47 
2  17  11  3  1 3.00 3.32 2.44 
3  21  2  2  2 1.00 4.39 5.48 
4 60  0  1  3  0.33  10.93  16.65 
5  24  12  3  1 3.00 4.42 4.16 
6  31  2  2  2 1.00 6.46 7.69 
7 40  0  1  4  0.25  6.25  10.60 
8  13  12  4  1 4.00 2.60 1.76 
9  21  2  2  3 0.67 3.56 5.52 
10 60  0  1 4  0.25  10.72  17.50 
11  18  12  4  1 4.00 3.26 2.76 
12  21  3  3  2 1.50 4.61 4.24 
13 80  0  1 4  0.25  13.14  23.23 
14  23  12  4  1 4.00 4.54 2.95 
15 43  6  2 3  0.67  6.79  10.55 
16 80  0  1 3  0.33  14.77  18.11 
17  32  16  3  1 3.00 5.47 3.52 
18 42  4  2 2  1.00  8.46  10.29 
 
The aim of this study is to determine if the choices made by the subjects when 
presented with the above 18 budget sets can be rationalized by a well-behaved utility 
function,  (,, ) DR UP π π . In the standard environment, Afriat’s (1967) theorem can be 6 
 
applied to the observed data to establish the existence of well behaved preferences that 
generated those choices.  Our budget set, however, differs substantially from budget set 
in the traditional utility theory framework. In the standard framework, given prices and 
income, a budget set with three goods defines a three-dimensional polyhedron, and the 
subject’s choice of any two goods on the frontier completely identifies the choice of the 
third. In the context of dictator games, however, there is only one degree of freedom in 
the subjects’ choices. Once P  is chosen, then, given endowments and prices, the final 
payoffs,  D π and R π , are completely determined by the system in (1), and satisfy the 
constraint:
hh






ππ += +≡ . That is, the budget set corresponds to a line 
in a three-dimensional space, and the dictator’s choice of P completely determines  D π  
and  R π (as shown in Figure 1). The constraints in (1) imply that only one degree of 
freedom exists in the subjects’ choices and that the trade-offs between each pair of the 
three goods ( D π ,  R π , P) are not well defined. This means that prices are not well defined, 






















Figure 1: Budget Set in a Modified Dictator Game 
 
3. Axioms and their Violations  7 
 
We will develop in this section an alternative argument to establish that observed 
choices can indeed be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. Let x, y, z,…. be 
distinct choices or bundles belonging to different budget sets.  Using Varian’s (1993) 
terminology, x is directly revealed preferred to y if y was available in the budget set when  
x was chosen; x is strictly directly revealed preferred to y if y was available and strictly 
inside the budget set when  x was chosen;  and x is revealed preferred to z if x is directly 
revealed preferred to y and y is directly revealed preferred to z.   
In the context of our model, when there is one degree of freedom in the choices of 
the subjects, a trivial modification of the direct revealed preference relation allows us to 
test whether subjects’ choices can be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. We 
will say that x is monotonically revealed preferred to y when x is directly revealed 
preferred to  ' y  and  ' y  contains more of every good than y. Bundle x is indirectly 
monotonically revealed preferred to y when x is monotonically revealed preferred to z 
and z is monotonically revealed preferred to y. Choices x and y are Monotonically 
Inconsistent if x is monotonically revealed preferred to y and y is monotonically revealed 
preferred to x.  





















Figure 2: Monotonically Inconsistent Choices in the Space of Payoffs and Pass 8 
 
  Figure 2 provides an example of Monotonically Inconsistent choices in the three-
dimensional space spanned by the final payoffs and the amount passed. Budget constraint 
A depicts the first budget in Table 1:  40 D E = ,  0 R E = ,  1 h p = , 3 p p = . Budget B 
corresponds to the second: 17 D E = ,  11 R E = ,  3 h p = ,  1 p p = . Let the subject choose 
bundle y = (37, 9, 3) when facing budget line A. Since y is chosen, it is directly revealed 
preferred to bundle ' x = (31, 27, 9), which is also available.  Bundle  ' x  has more of every 
good than bundle x = (27, 19, 8). Therefore, y is monotonically revealed preferred to x. 
Similarly, let the subject choose bundle x when facing budget line B. Since x is chosen, it 
is directly revealed preferred to  ' y  = (39, 15, 4), another point on budget line B.  Bundle 
' y  has more of every good than y. Therefore, x is monotonically revealed preferred to y, 
which establishes that the choices x and y are Monotonically Inconsistent. 
In what follows, we will classify the subjects in our experiment as making 
Monotonically Inconsistent choices or not. For subjects whose choices are Monotonically 
Inconsistent we will prove the following theorem:  
Theorem: If the observed choices are Monotonically Inconsistent, no non-satiated utility 
function exists that could rationalize the choices. 
For subjects whose choices are not Monotonically Inconsistent, we will use the 
following Result to establish that a well behaved utility function that rationalizes those 
choices exists: 
Result: If the observed choices are not Monotonically Inconsistent and there exists a set 
of artificial prices
i p so that the data are consistent with the Generalized Axiom of 
Revealed Preferences, then a non-satiated, continuous, concave, monotonic utility 
function that rationalizes the choices exists. 
A proof of the Theorem and the Result is in the Appendix.  
We check whether subjects’ choices are Monotonically Inconsistent under the 
budget scenarios listed in Table 1. If they are, then using our Theorem, we conclude that 
a well-behaved utility function,  (,, ) DR UP π π , that rationalizes these choices does not 
exist.  If the observed choices are not Monotonically Inconsistent, then we find artificial 
prices such that the observed choices are consistent with the Generalized Axiom of 9 
 
Revealed Preferences and, using our Result, conclude that a well-behaved utility function 
that rationalizes subjects’ choices exists. 
 
4. The Experimental Procedure 
The experiment consisted of 6 sessions conducted in the Experimental Laboratory for 
Economics and Business Research at Virginia Commonwealth University in the Spring 
2009. A total of 178 subjects recruited from introductory economics and business classes 
participated in the experiment. In sessions 1-4, subjects were randomly assigned by the 
computer the role of dictator (Blue player) or recipient (Green player). In these sessions, 
we had 57 dictators and 57 recipients. Subjects earned an average of $8.98. We added 
sessions 5 and 6, in which, as in Andreoni and Miller’s design, each subject was both a 
dictator and a recipient.  In these two sessions, we had 62 subjects who earned an average 
of $13.06.  
 Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated at computer terminals and given a 
set of instructions (included in the Appendix), which were later read aloud by the 
experimenter. The instructions concluded with a quiz designed to help the participants 
become familiar with the type of choices involved in the dictator game. The monitor 
checked the answers to the quiz to make sure that all subjects clearly understood the 
nature of the choices. After the quiz, in sessions 1-4, the computer randomly determined 
the role of each subject, either dictator (Blue player) or recipient (Green player). 
Throughout the session, no communication between subjects was permitted and 
all information and choices were transmitted through computer terminals, using the 
software program z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each dictator player made simultaneously 
all 18 decisions specified in Table 1. Next, the dictator’s decisions were transmitted by 
the computer anonymously to the recipient randomly paired with that dictator. After the 
recipients recorded the 18 decisions on their own personal record sheets, the computer 
randomly determined which of the 18 decisions to implement and pay out. The subjects 
recorded their payoffs in a personal log sheet and proceeded to be paid privately by an 
assistant not involved with the experiment. At this time, the subjects also received a $5 
participation fee.  
 10 
 
5. Dictators’ Rationality 
Our primary goal is to determine whether or not the decisions of the dictators can be 
rationalized. Before doing so, we examine whether the data in our experiment is 
consistent with results reported by previous studies. We also examine whether the results 
in sessions 1-4 differ significantly from the results in sessions 5-6. The analysis provides 
some external validity to our experiments and suggests that sessions 1-4 and 5-6 may be 
pooled. 
We begin by examining whether the data in our experiment are representative of 
other studies that use the standard dictator game. We find that the results are strikingly 
similar. Three budgets, 3, 6, and 18, are relatively close to budgets presented in the 
standard dictator game. Under these budgets, the relative price of giving equals 1 and the 
recipient’s endowment is quite small, less than 10 percent of the dictator’s endowment. 
The last two columns of Table 1 report the average number of tokens passed in sessions 
1-4 and 5-6 for each budget set. The percentages of tokens passed in session 1-4 under 
budgets 3, 6, and 8 are 21 percent, 21 percent, and 22 percent, respectively.  The 
percentages of tokens passed in session 5-6 under budgets 3, 6, and 8 are 26 percent, 25 
percent, and 25 percent, respectively. The average across all three budgets and six 
sessions is 23 percent, which is quite close to the pass rates reported in the literature for 
the standard game. 
Next we compare our results with those reported by Andreoni and Miller for two 
identical budgets. We again find similarity in the results. Budgets 1 and 7 in our 
experiment are identical to budgets 2 and 11 in Andreoni and Miller. The average 
amounts passed under budgets 1 and 7 in sessions 5-6 of our experiments are 11.47 and 
10.60, respectively. The average amounts passed under budgets 2 and 11 of their 
experiments are 12.80 and 14.80, respectively. 
Can sessions 1-4 be pooled with sessions 5-6?  We are unable to find any 
significant differences in the choices using two different tests, and conclude that pooling 
the six sessions is appropriate. We use the Mann-Whitney test to compare the median 
amounts passed under each budget. We prefer to compare medians rather than means 
because heterogeneity of dictators’ giving results in highly non-symmetric and 
multimodal distributions of the amount passed. The median amounts are identical for 8 11 
 
budgets and they are never significantly different at the 5 percent level.  We also compare 
the distribution of the amounts passed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  Again, for all 
18 budgets, the distributions in sessions 1-4 do not significantly differ from the 
distributions in sessions 5-6 at the 5 percent significance level. 
We are now prepared to address directly the primary question in the paper: can 
dictators’ giving be rationalized by a well-behaved impure altruism utility function of the 
form  (,, ) DR UP π π ? We find that 78 (66 percent) of our 119 dictators never make 
Monotonically Inconsistent choices. We then identify artificial prices that make those 
choices consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference and, using our 
Result, conclude that a well-behaved utility function that rationalizes the subjects’ 
choices exists.
4  Table 2 contains information about the 41 subjects whose choices are 
Monotonically Inconsistent. The first three columns of Table 2 list the sessions, the 
subjects with inconsistent choices and the number of inconsistent choices.  
 





Sessions 1‐4:  1 1 0.99 
  2 2 1.00* 
  8 2 1.00* 
  10 15 0.97 
  15 22 0.87 
  16 1 1.00* 
  17 7 1.00* 
  18 19 0.90 
  19 7 0.97 
  34 27 0.72 
  36 1 1.00* 
  37 14 0.83 
  42 1 1.00* 
  50 11 0.95 
  51 1 1.00* 
                                                 
4 The set of artificial prices is available upon request. Note that prices were found for each subject 
that did not make any monotonically inconsistent choices.  Since the prices are not real, the choices satisfy 
GARP in an artificial sense. 12 
 
  54 6 0.93 
  57 4 0.95 
      
Sessions 5‐6:  60 24 0.90 
  62 1 1.00* 
  64 6 0.93 
  66 10 0.97 
  67 2 1.00* 
  75 9 1.00* 
  77 36 0.83 
  78 5 0.95 
  81 2 1.00* 
  85 3 0.95 
  87 14 0.92 
  92 6 0.97 
  93 16 0.77 
  94 8 0.93 
  99 3 1.00* 
  101 17 0.92 
  104 8 0.83 
  105 31 0.83 
  106 1 1.00* 
  107 8 0.99 
  109 1 0.96 
  115 4 0.95 
  117 1 1.00* 
   119 13 0.90 
  
Note: * Indicates that an ε -change eliminates all MIC choices.  
 
Few dictators make severely Monotonically Inconsistent choices. As in Andreoni 
and Miller (2002), we use a modification of Afriat’s (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency 
Index (CCEI) to measure the severity of inconsistencies. The index shows the lowest 
value by which the dictator’s endowment has to be multiplied to eliminate all 
inconsistencies. The CCEI can be interpreted as the highest amount of the endowment 
that the dictator ‘wastes’ by making inconsistent choices. The last column in Table 2 
reports the index. Only 15 (13 percent) of the dictators have a CCEI below 0.95 (the 13 
 
threshold adopted by Varian (1991)). These 15 subjects appear to be ‘wasting’ more than 
5 percent of their endowment. 
Our revealed preference tests are quite powerful according to Bronars’ (1987) 
test.  Ex-ante, our experiment offers many opportunities to display an inconsistent 
behavior. To show this, we generate artificial choices for 50,000 subjects by randomly 
drawing points from a uniform distribution over each budget set.  The vast majority of 
these simulated subjects, 94.7 percent, make Monotonically Inconsistent choices at least 
once, with an average of 23.40 inconsistencies. Ex-post, dictators also make choices that 
could lead to many inconsistencies. To demonstrate this, we generate artificial choices for 
50,000 subjects by randomly drawing from the set of actual choices made in the 
experiment. Even more of these bootstrapped subjects, 97.7 percent, make Monotonically 
Inconsistent choices at least once, with an average of 24.52 inconsistencies. 
A natural question to ask is whether adding the amount passed as a third argument 
in the utility function is necessary. That is, can the behavior of the dictators be 
rationalized by the purely altruistic utility function,  (,) D R U π π ? If we limit our analysis 
to the final payoff space,(,) D R π π , 71 (60 percent) of the 119 dictators violate GARP at 
least once, and 47 (40 percent) have severe violations with a CCEI below 0.95. On the 
other hand, 10 percent of Andreoni and Miller subjects violate the axiom at least once, 
and only 2 percent have severe violations. Thus, we find that the third argument is crucial 
when crowding out is possible.   
The fact that in our design the recipients’ endowments take positive values in 12 
out of 18 decisions explains why our results differ so dramatically from Andreoni and 
Miller’s results.  Incomplete crowding out is possible only when the recipient’s 
endowment varies and may lead to violations of the revealed preference axioms in the 
final payoffs’ space.  Andreoni and Miller do not detect violations of the axioms in the 
final payoff space due to incomplete crowding because they never gave recipients a 
positive endowment. 
 
6. Estimating Individual Preferences to Predict Out-of-Sample Behavior 
Having established that the impure altruism utility function, (,, ) DR UP π π , rationalizes the 
choices for most of the dictators, we next determine its form and estimate its parameters 14 
 
to make out-of-sample predictions. We find that the impure altruism model provides 
fairly accurate predictions for experiments conducted by Bolton and Katok (1998) and 
List (2007).   
Following Andreoni and Miller (2002) and the replication of their experiment by 
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), we begin by estimating the parameters of a 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution utility function  
()
1
(, ) )( 1 , DR D R UP P
ρρ ρ ρ απ βπ πα πβ ++ =− −  . 
Parameters α  and β  are the relative weights on the payoff to the dictator and the 
recipient, respectively. The CES function incorporates a number of other utility functions 
as special cases as the parameterρ  varies. As ρ approaches -1, utility converges to 
perfect substitutes preferences:  (, 1 ) ,( ) DR DR PP U απβ π β π α π + +−− = ; as 
ρ approaches −∞, utility converges to Leontief preferences: 
(,, )m i n { , ) } ,(1 DR D R UP P απ π β π π αβ − − = ; and as ρ approaches 0, utility converges to 
the Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
(1 ) (,, ) DR DR P UP
α βα β π ππ π
−− = . 
Maximizing the CES function subject to the budget constraints in (1) yields the 
following first order condition: 
  () ( ) ( ) ()
1 1 1 10 Dh R p PP p Ep E P
ρ ρ ρ αβ α β
− − − −− − −+ − = , 
which we solve numerically for the optimal pass  ,,, , (; , ) DRhp Epp PE αβρ. As in 
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), we specify the econometric model for individual 
dictators in terms of budget shares:  
  () () , ,,, , , ;
n n nnn n n
Di D R h p i i i h D in
i nn
EP E E p p p
mm
αβρ π −
=+ ε ,   1,...,18 n =  
where  (,,,; ,,)
nn n n
iDRh piii PE E p p α βρis the optimal pass for subject i under budget n ,  i ε are 
i.i.d. normally distributed errors with mean zero and variance 
2














≤≤ , the distribution for  i ε is truncated.  We estimate i α ,  i β ,  i ρ and 
2
i σ via  
a non-linear two-limit Tobit maximum likelihood. Prior to estimation we omit 30 subjects 
with uniformly selfish choices,  1 subject who chose to equalize final payoffs in all 18 15 
 
decisions  (Leontief), and 2 subjects that uniformly chose to maximize the sum of final 
payoffs (perfect substitutes).  
For the remaining 86 subjects (72 percent), we estimate the parameters using the 
CES specification. For 53 subjects, the sum ˆ ˆii α β + is approximately one; for 52 of these 
53 subjects ˆ 0.5 i ρ <− .  A small Monte-Carlo study we conducted confirmed that 
parameters  i α  and  i β are poorly identified when the true  0.5 ρ < − . To address this 
problem we re-estimated the parameters for all 52 subjects with  ˆ 0.5 i ρ < − restricting the 
CES to Leontief preferences. We also re-estimated the parameters for 32 subjects for 
whom  ˆi ρ was within three standard deviations from 0, restricting the CES to Cobb-
Douglas preferences. For those subjects for whom we estimated both a Leontief and a 
Cobb-Douglas function, we use estimates for the specification with the smallest root-
mean squared error.  
The estimates of the subjects’ preferences allow us to predict the Bolton and 
Katok (1998) results with an impressive accuracy. Bolton and Katok (1998) examined 
dictators’ giving under two treatments: treatment 18-2 in which $18 D E = ,  $2 R E = , 
$1 h p = ,  $1 p p = , and treatment 15-5, in which $15 D E = ,  $5 R E = ,  $1 h p = ,  $1 p p = . 
Compared to treatment 18-2, in treatment 15-5 the experimenter transfers $3 from the 
dictator to the recipient. If the transfer completely crowds out private giving the average 
amount passed should fall by $3. Our estimates, however, suggest that many dictators 
care not only about final payoffs, but also about the amount passed and, thus, crowding 
out will be incomplete. We predict the amount passed for each of our 119 dictators under 
both treatments.  The average amount passed falls from $3.70 in the 18-2 treatment to 
$2.53 in the 15-5 treatment. Thus, we predict crowding out to be incomplete, about one-
third ($1.17) of the $3 transfer. Our prediction is close to Bolton and Katok’s (1998) 
results, as they found that the average amount passed fell by $0.86 from $3.48 in the 18-2 
treatment to $2.62 in the 15-5 treatment.   
We consider next List’s (2007) experiment. It involved a taking game in which 
the dictator is not only allowed to give to the recipient, but also may take part of the 
recipient’s endowment.  In addition to the standard 10-5 treatment, in which $10 D E = , 16 
 
$5 R E = ,  $1 h p = ,  $1 p p = and the dictator can only give, List conducted two additional 
treatments.  In the ‘take-1’ treatment, the dictator was allowed to take up to $1 from the 
recipient, and in the ‘take-5’ treatment, the dictator was allowed to take up to $5 from the 
recipient.  List compares giving across these three treatments and finds substantial 
differences in giving.   
List’s taking treatments are isomorphically equivalent in payoffs to treatments 
where taking is not allowed. The take-1 treatment corresponds to the 11-4 case in 
which $11 D E = ,  $4 R E = ,  $1 h p = ,  $1 p p = and taking is not allowed, In both cases, the 
maximum final payoff to the dictator is $11, the maximum final payoff to the recipient is 
$4, and every dollar added to the recipient’s payoff reduces the dictator’s payoff by one. 
Similarly, the take-5 design can be represented as the 15-5 treatment in which $15 D E = , 
$0 R E = ,  $1 h p = ,  $1 p p = . 
The predictions based on our estimates mimic closely the changes in final payoffs 
observed by List. Based on our estimates, we predict that the average amount passed 
should fall from $3.58 in the 15-0 treatment to $1.72 in the 11-4 treatment and to $1.43 in 
the 10-5 treatment.  These results imply that the average payoff to the recipients would 
fall from $6.43 in the 10-5 treatment, to $5.72 in the 11-4 treatment, and to $3.58 in the 
15-0 treatment. List (2007) reports that the average final payoff to the recipients falls 
from $6.33 in the 10-5 and take-1 treatments to $2.52 in the take-5 treatment. We 
conclude that our reinterpretation of List’s treatments, together with incomplete crowding 
out, accounts for most of the differences in dictators’ behavior observed by List (2007).  
 
7. Conclusion 
Few economic models incorporate altruism despite overwhelming evidence of unselfish 
behavior.  Our research extends the work of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, 
Kariv, and Markovits (2007) in establishing that unselfish behavior meets economists’ 
definition of rationality and that a standard, testable utility maximization model fits well 
the evidence from the laboratory and from the field. Following the approach of Andreoni 
and Miller’s seminal paper, we show that dictator’s choices can be rationalized by the 
impure altruism utility function,  (,, ) DR UP π π . Such utility function can rationalize 17 
 
incomplete crowding out “…the oldest and the most important question in public 
economics” (Andreoni and Payne, 2009, p.1).  Our results suggest that models of giving 
that fail to incorporate the utility the donor derives from giving are incomplete. The 
behavior of 66 percent of the dictators in our experiment can be rationalized with the 
impurely altruistic utility function, while only 40 percent of the dictators make choices 
that are consistent with the purely altruistic utility function.  
  Our results confirm the importance of recognizing that individuals attach value to 
the act of giving. If the government were to reduce its contributions to charitable 
organizations and simultaneously decrease taxes by the same amount with a balanced 
budget fiscal policy, incomplete crowding out predicts a decrease in charitable giving, 
while complete crowding out predicts no change in charity revenue.  Alternatively, if the 
government were to increase its contributions with a balanced budget fiscal policy, 
charity revenue will increase.  More importantly, we establish that such incomplete 




Let the vector  x denote the triple  ,) (, DR P π π of observed choices. Let 
i x be a chosen 
triple under given values of  ,,,
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DRHP EEpp , for  1,..., in = . Let the set of all  x such that 
3 xR
+ ∈ : 
j x x < or 









π ππ π += +define a polyhedron 
i S  
as depicted in blue in Figure 3.  We will say that the utility function  ,, ) ( () DR P UU x π π =  
rationalizes the set of n observations ( )
i x if  ) (( )
i Ux Ux ≥  for all 
i xS ∈ .  
 
Theorem: If the observed choices are Monotonically Inconsistent, no non-satiated utility 
function exists that could rationalize the choices.  
 
Proof: Let 
i x  and 
j x  be two monotonically inconsistent choices.  By definition of 
Monotonically Inconsistency, 
i x  is monotonically revealed preferred to 
j x  and 
j x  is 
monotonically revealed preferred to 
i x .  This implies that 
i x  is directly revealed 
preferred to  ˆ
j x  and  ˆ
j x
 contains more of every good than 
j x , or 
j i x S ∈ . Similarly 
j x  is 
directly revealed preferred to  ˆ
i x  and  ˆ
i x
 contains more of every good than 
i x , or 
ij x S ∈ .  18 
 
Assume to the contrary that a nonsatiated utility function exists and it rationalizes the 
observed choices 
i x  and 
j x . By definition of rationalization, 
j i x S ∈  implies that 
( () )
ij UU x x ≥ .  If  ( () )
ij UU x x = ,  by local nonsatiation there exists an  x  such that 
i x S ∈  and  ( () )) (
j i xU x U U x >=. But then  () Ux cannot rationalize 
i x because there is 
i x S ∈ such that  ( () )
i x Ux U > .  Then, it must be  ( () )
ij UU x x > .  Similarly, we can show 
that 
ij x S ∈  implies that  ( () )
j i UU x x > . This contradicts our previous claim that 
( () )
ij UU x x > .,  
 
To establish the Result, given any triple
i x we construct an artificial set of strictly 
positive prices 
i p  such that
i
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x π ππ π
+ ∈+ = +  . Let the set 
i S be defined as { } 3 :
ii i i Sx R p x p x
+ =∈ ≥ , 
depicted in green in Figure 3. Notice that by construction
ii SS ⊂ . 
 
 
Figure 3: Geometry of S and S   
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Result: If the observed choices are not Monotonically Inconsistent and there exists a set 
of artificial prices
i p so that the data are consistent with the Generalized Axiom of 
Revealed Preferences, then a non-satiated, continuous, concave, monotonic utility 
function that rationalizes the choices exists.
  
Proof:  Let 
i x   1,..., in =  be a set of observations that are not Monotonically Inconsistent, 
ii i xS S ∈⊂for all i.  Afriat’s theorem can be applied to the set
i S . If the observations 
i x  
satisfy GARP, then by Afriat’s theorem there exists a well behaved utility function 
() Uxthat rationalizes the choices, so that  ) (( )
i Ux Ux ≥ for all x such that
ii i p xp x ≥  or 
i xS ∈ . Since 
ii SS ⊂ ,  ) (( )
i Ux Ux ≥ for all 
i xS ∈ . This implies that the same utility 
function rationalizes the individual’s choices over the polyhedron
i S ., 
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 INSTRUCTIONS (1-4) 
 
Welcome 
  This is an experiment about decision making. You will receive a $5 show-up fee for 
participating. You may also earn additional money depending on the decisions that you and the 
other participants will make. The entire experiment should be completed within an hour. You 
may discontinue your participation in the experiment at any time. At the end of the experiment 
you will be paid privately and in cash for your decisions. A research foundation has provided the 
funds for this experiment.  
 
    
Your identity 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the experiment 
and your name will never be linked to any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions 




You will be either a Blue player or a Green player in this experiment. At the beginning of the 
experiment, the computer will randomly determine whether you are Blue or Green. The 
computer will also randomly pair each Blue player with a Green player. You will not be told 
each other’s identity.  
 
Blue will be asked to make a series of 18 choices about how to divide a set of tokens between 
herself and the Green player. How Blue chooses in each decision is entirely a question of 
personal preference—there is no right or wrong answer. As Blue divides the tokens, Blue and 
Green will earn points. Every point that subjects earn will be worth 10 cents. For example, if you 
earn 58 points, you will make $5.80 in the experiment. 
 
Each choice that Blue makes is similar to the following: 
 
Green has 15 points. Divide 50 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
In this choice Green starts with 15 points. Blue must divide 50 tokens.  Blue can keep all the 
tokens, keep some and pass some, or pass all the tokens. In this example, Blue will receive 1 
point for every token she holds, and Green will receive 2 points for every token Blue passes. For 
example:  
•  If Blue holds 50 and passes 0 tokens: 
o  Blue will receive 50 points, or earn 50 × $0.10 = $5.00.  
o  Green will receive no points. Since Green started with 15 points, she will earn 
(0+15) × $0.10 = 15 × $0.10 = $1.50.  
•  If Blue holds 0 tokens and passes 50: 
o  Blue will receive 0 points, or earn $0.  
o  Green will receive 50 × 2=100 points. Since Green started with 15 points, she will 
earn (100 + 15) × $0.10 = 115 × $0.10 = $11.50.  
 
 However, Blue could choose any number between 0 and 50 to hold. For instance, 
•  If Blue chooses to hold 29 tokens and pass 21:  
o  Blue would receive 29 points, or earn 29 × $0.10 = $2.90.  
o  Green would receive 21× 2 = 42 points, and earn (42 + 15) × $0.10 = 57 × $0.10 
= $5.70. 
 
Here is another example: 
 
Green has 9 points. Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
In this example, Green starts with 9 points, every token Blue holds earns her 3 points, and every 
token Blue passes to Green earns Green 1 point. 
•  Suppose Blue holds 24 tokens and passes 16. 
o  Blue will receive  ___ × ___  = ___ points and earn               ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  Green will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + ____) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
To check your understanding, fill in the blanks above. You are free to use your own calculator, 
or one provided by the experimenter. Please raise your hand if you have questions.  Also raise 
your hand when you are finished. 
 
•  Now, suppose Blue holds 40 and passes 0 tokens in the above example. 
o  Blue will receive  ___ × ___  = ___  points and earn              ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  Green will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + ____) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
Please fill in the blanks above. Please raise your hand if you have questions.  Also raise your 
hand when you are finished. 
 
Here is another example for you to check your understanding: 
 
Green has 9 points. Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
•  Suppose Blue holds 24 tokens and passes 16. 
o  Blue will receive  ___ × ___  = ___ points and earn               ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  Green will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + ____) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
•  Suppose Blue holds 0 tokens and passes 40. 
o  Blue will receive  ___ × ___  = ___ points and earn               ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  Green will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + ____) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
Please fill in the blanks above. Please raise your hand if you have questions.  Also raise your 
hand when you are finished. 
 Blue will be asked to make the 18 allocation decisions listed below. Note that these decisions 
will appear in a different, random order on the computer screen. 
 
Green has 0 points. Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 11 points. Divide 17 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 2 points.   Divide 21 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 0 points.   Divide 60 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 12 points. Divide 24 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 2 points.   Divide 31 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 0 points.   Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 4 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 12 points. Divide 13 tokens: HOLD______ @ 4 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 2 points.   Divide 21 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 0 points.   Divide 60 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 4 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 12 points. Divide 18 tokens: HOLD______ @ 4 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 3 points.   Divide 21 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 0 points.   Divide 80 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 4 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 12 points. Divide 23 tokens: HOLD______ @ 4 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 6 points.   Divide 43 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 0 points.   Divide 80 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 16 points. Divide 32 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
Green has 4 points.   Divide 42 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
Important Note: In all 18 decisions Blue can choose any number to hold and any number to pass. 
How Blue chooses in each decision is entirely a question of personal preference—there is no 
right or wrong answer. The only restriction on your choices is that the number of tokens held by 
Blue plus the number of tokens passed to Green MUST equal the number of tokens to divide. 
 
Earnings 
The computer will randomly select one of the 18 decisions to carry out. The number of points 
Blue and Green receive on the decision selected will determine the earnings for each player for 
the experiment. Again, every point will be worth 10 cents.  Each decision has an equal chance of 
being selected.  Because no one knows which decision will be used, it is in Blue’s best interest to 
make all 18 decisions carefully.  
The experiment is about to begin. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  Fill the claim check below and raise your hand when you are done.  
 
CLAIM CHECK (Blue) 
 
 
The computer randomly selected for payment the game in which: 
 
 
GREEN had __ points 
and you had _____ tokens to divide. 
 
 
You passed _____ tokens to GREEN 
at _____ point(s) each. 
 
 
You held _____ tokens  
at _____ point(s) each. 
 
 
As a result, you receive ____ points  
and earn $____. 
 
 Fill the claim check below and raise your hand when you are done. 
 
CLAIM CHECK (Green) 
 
 
The computer randomly selected for payment the game in which: 
 
 
You started with _____ points 
and BLUE had _____ tokens to divide. 
 
 
BLUE Passed _____ tokens to you 
at _____ point(s) each. 
 
 
As a result, you receive ___ points from Blue, 
you end the game with ___ total points 
 and earn $ ____ . 
 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS (5-6) 
 
Welcome 
  This is an experiment about decision making. You will receive a $5 show-up fee for 
participating. You may also earn additional money depending on the decisions that you and the 
other participants will make. The entire experiment should be completed within an hour. You 
may discontinue your participation in the experiment at any time. At the end of the experiment 
you will be paid privately and in cash for your decisions. A research foundation has provided the 
funds for this experiment.  
 
    
Your identity 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the experiment 
and your name will never be linked to any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions 




You will be asked to make a series of 18 choices about how to divide a set of tokens between 
yourself and another participant in the room. We will refer to the person with whom you will be 
paired as OTHER. You and OTHER will be paired randomly and will not be told each other’s 
identity.  
 
As you divide the tokens, you and OTHER will each earn points. These points will be worth 10 
cents each. For example, if you earn 58 points, you will make $5.80 in the experiment. 
 
Each choice that you make is similar to the following: 
 
OTHER has 15 points. Divide 50 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
In this choice OTHER starts with 15 points and you must divide 50 tokens.  You can keep all the 
tokens, keep some and pass some, or pass all the tokens. In this example, you will receive 1 point 
for every token you hold, and OTHER will receive 2 points for every token you pass. For 
example:  
•  If you hold 50 and pass 0 tokens: 
o  You will receive 50 points, or earn 50 × $0.10 = $5.00.  
o  OTHER will receive no points. Since OTHER started with 15 points, she will 
earn (0+15) × $0.10 = 15 × $0.10 = $1.50.  
•  If you hold 0 tokens and pass 50: 
o  You will receive 0 points, or earn $0.  
o  OTHER will receive 50 × 2=100 points. Since OTHER started with 15 points, she 
will earn (100 + 15) × $0.10 = 115 × $0.10 = $11.50.  
However, you could choose any number between 0 and 50 to hold. For instance, 
•  If you choose to hold 29 tokens and pass 21:  
o  You would receive 29 points, or earn 29 × $0.10 = $2.90.  
o  OTHER would receive 21× 2 = 42 points, and earn (42 + 15) × $0.10 = 57 × 
$0.10 = $5.70. Here is another example: 
 
OTHER has 9 points. Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
In this example, OTHER starts with 9 points, every token you hold earns you 3 points, and every 
token you pass to OTHER earns OTHER 1 point. 
•  Suppose you hold 24 tokens and pass 16. 
o  You will receive  ___ × ___  = ___ points and earn               ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  OTHER will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + __) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
To check your understanding, fill in the blanks above. You are free to use your own calculator, 
or one provided by the experimenter. Please raise your hand if you have questions.  Also raise 
your hand when you are finished. 
 
•  Now, suppose you hold 40 and pass 0 tokens in the above example. 
o  You will receive  ___ × ___  = ___  points and earn              ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  OTHER will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + __) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
Please fill in the blanks above. Please raise your hand if you have questions.  Also raise your 
hand when you are finished. 
 
Here is another example for you to check your understanding: 
 
OTHER has 9 points. Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
•  Suppose you hold 24 tokens and pass 16. 
o  You will receive  ___ × ___  = ___ points and earn               ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  OTHER will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + __) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
•  Suppose you hold 0 tokens and pass 40. 
o  You will receive  ___ × ___  = ___ points and earn               ___  × $0.10 = $____ 
o  OTHER will receive___ × ___  = ___ points and earn (___ + __) × $0.10 = $____ 
 
Please fill in the blanks above. Please raise your hand if you have questions.  Also raise your 
hand when you are finished. 
 You will be asked to make the 18 allocation decisions listed below. Note that these decisions will 
appear in a different, random order on the computer screen. 
 
OTHER has 0 points. Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 11 points. Divide 17 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 2 points.   Divide 21 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 0 points.   Divide 60 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 12 points. Divide 24 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 2 points.   Divide 31 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 0 points.   Divide 40 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 4 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 12 points. Divide 13 tokens: HOLD______ @ 4 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 2 points.   Divide 21 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 0 points.   Divide 60 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 4 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 12 points. Divide 18 tokens: HOLD______ @ 4 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 3 points.   Divide 21 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 2 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 0 points.   Divide 80 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 4 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 12 points. Divide 23 tokens: HOLD______ @ 4 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 6 points.   Divide 43 tokens: HOLD______ @ 2 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 0 points.   Divide 80 tokens: HOLD______ @ 1 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 3 point(s) each. 
 
OTHER has 16 points. Divide 32 tokens: HOLD______ @ 3 point(s) each, and PASS _____ @ 1 point(s) each. 
 




Important Note: In all 18 decisions you can choose any number to hold and any number to pass. 
How you choose in each decision is entirely a question of personal preference—there is no right 
or wrong answer. The only restriction on your choices is that the number of tokens you hold plus 
the number of tokens you pass MUST equal the number of tokens to divide. 
 
Any of the 18 decisions has an equal chance of being selected.  Because no one knows which 







After everyone has made their decisions, the computer will randomly select one of the 18 
decisions to carry out for payment.  
 
The computer will randomly pair you with another subject in this experiment. You will then get 
the points you allocated in the HOLD portion of your decision, and other subject will get the 
points you allocated in the PASS portion of your decision plus the points with which she started.   
 
Next, you will be paired again with a different subject in the experiment. This time we will use 
the other subject's decision to carry out. You will earn the points allocated in the PASS portion 
plus the points with which you started in this decision. 
Your earnings will equal the sum of the points you earn. These points will be worth 10 cents 
each. 
In the end of the experiment, you will bring your claim check to the assistant not involved in the 
experiment, and she will pay you your earnings in cash. This will help to guarantee privacy of 
your decisions. 
 
The experiment is about to begin. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
  
Fill the claim check below and raise your hand when you are done.  
 
CLAIM CHECK  
 
The computer randomly selected the following decision: 
 





IN THE FIRST RANDOM PAIRING: 
 
You held _____ tokens  
at _____ point(s) each. 
 
As a result, you receive ____ points. 
 
 
IN THE SECOND RANDOM PAIRING: 
 
You started with _____ points. 
OTHER passed _____ tokens to you 
at _____ point(s) each. 
 
You receive _____ additional points. 
 
  
As a result, you end the game with _____ total points 
 
Your final earning is $________ 
 
 